The announcement that the Port of Antwerp-Bruges will receive an air defense system is undoubtedly an important development. But it also raises fundamental questions about scale, strategy, and future readiness.
A late, but necessary step
Since the early 2000s, Belgium has almost completely dismantled its remaining air defense capacity. The Mistral systems in Koksijde were withdrawn without a fully-fledged alternative replacing them.
That is remarkable for a country that:
- hosts the European institutions
- houses NATO headquarters in Evere
- hosts SHAPE, NATO’s operational command center
- operates Europe’s second busiest port
- serves as a key logistical hub for U.S. military equipment toward Eastern Europe
- hosts Europe’s largest chemical cluster
- contains multiple nuclear sites and an international airport
In that light, it is difficult to deny that the current investment is primarily a necessary catch-up operation. At last, defense is being taken seriously again.
Beware of symbolic batteries and symbolic missiles
However important, the port is only one of Belgium’s many strategic assets. Setting priorities is a political responsibility, but what is especially needed is a well-designed and flexible coverage plan — one that evolves with changing threat profiles.
The systems often referred to today — such as NASAMS and Patriot — rank among NATO’s most capable air defense systems. But they are far from a silver bullet.
In Ukraine, but also in Poland and Romania, it has become clear that these systems are not economically sustainable against cheap drones. A single NASAMS interceptor can easily cost between €1 and €3 million. A Patriot interceptor is even more expensive. A full battery costs roughly €300 million.
This turns such systems into a “weapon of last resort.” They must be embedded in a layered air defense architecture. In practice, attacks today occur in waves, designed to saturate air defense systems. The first defensive layers — cheaper, more numerous, faster to deploy — are therefore crucial.
The need for an evolved, layered capability
Modern air defense is no longer just about intercepting ballistic or hypersonic missiles. The war in Ukraine shows how broad the threat spectrum has become: drones, cruise missiles, swarms, hybrid combinations.
What is required is:
- a layered system (different ranges and reaction times)
- a federated approach (interoperability between systems and countries)
- a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic means
In other words: not a loose purchase of batteries, but an integrated ecosystem.
Technology alone is not enough: training and adaptability are crucial
Even with the right systems in place, another challenge remains: human and organizational capacity.
NATO exercises in Estonia have demonstrated that possessing expensive and modern weapons systems is insufficient if they can be disabled by a handful of drone operators. The current reality is a constant “red queen race” between offensive and defensive capabilities, where firepower must be combined with economically responsible diversification and continuous adaptation.
The Ukrainian armed forces evaluate developments daily across sectors and adjust their strategy almost in real time based on Russian attack patterns. This requires:
- rapid feedback loops
- systematic integration of lessons learned
- adaptive command structures
- trust and data-sharing between NATO partners
Belgium has intelligent and well-trained units capable of operating autonomously. But the additional layer of systematic, cross-border adaptability, in close cooperation with NATO partners, will require years of investment in collaboration, interoperability, and trust. It also demands a cultural shift: the most critical shortcoming today is no longer making a strategic mistake, but failing to learn quickly enough.
Visible threats vs. hybrid reality
Air defense is politically attractive. It is visible, tangible, and relatively easy to communicate. Placing a battery is a clear and decisive action.
But the most significant and continuous threat lies in the hybrid domain. Russia has never stopped operating there. Cyberattacks, disinformation, sabotage, interference with critical infrastructure, these are domains where:
- we sometimes do not even realize we are under attack
- the point of attack remains unclear
- the response rarely lies in defense alone
For projectiles, we can build models. We can calculate how many interceptors are needed for a given coverage percentage. Hybrid threats confront us with “unknown unknowns.” They require systemic resilience and coordination across multiple layers of society.
Toward a “whole-of-society” approach
If current investments in air defense become a catalyst for a broader resilience strategy, they are valuable. Then they form a stepping stone toward a whole-of-society model in which defense, businesses, infrastructure operators, cybersecurity experts, and policymakers collaborate structurally.
In such a scenario, these actors build multilayered cyber-physical resilience together, safeguard systemic nodes of critical infrastructure and business continuity, and, as in Finland, take vulnerabilities into account even in civilian investments. This prevents situations where, for example, one only later discovers that major infrastructure projects cannot support heavy military transport.
If investments remain stuck in symbolism, a few batteries, a few missiles, without an integrated concept, they risk becoming an inefficient use of resources.
The core question, therefore, is not whether air defense is necessary. It is, look at what's happening in Iran and the Gulf states.
The real question is whether we are willing to embed it in a broader, adaptive, and societal resilience strategy. Is this the beginning of a mature defense shift, or will it remain an exercise in muscle-flexing?
Want to know more? Register for the webinar: Foresight: Staying strategically agile in disruptive times.
Geopolitical tensions and sudden shocks can shape the trajectory of organizations for years. In a world where ecosystems shift and assumptions quickly become obsolete, relying solely on historical data is no longer sufficient. In this webinar, you will discover how strategic foresight helps you work with multiple possible futures, so you can steer more deliberately and adaptively today.
